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H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender

Benefit Adequacy in State
and Provincial Workers’
Compensation Programs
F

or over 30 years, the Upjohn
Institute has been involved in research
and analysis of state and provincial
workers’ compensation programs for
workers disabled by their employment
in Australia, Canada, and the United
States. These programs mandate medical
treatment to promote recovery and return
to work, as well as wage-replacement
benefits to enable workers to maintain
themselves during the recovery, and are
financed by employer contributions, either
through private insurance or public funds.

It is still not possible to make
acceptably accurate and
meaningful comparisons among
systems across different studies.
A major focus of this policy work
at the Upjohn Institute has been the
adequacy of wage-replacement benefits
for these workers. If benefits are too low,
injured workers will struggle to recover
and perhaps become a burden on society.
If benefits are too high, employers will
bear unnecessary expense and injured
workers may be tempted to malinger.
A highlight for the Institute was
the publication in 2004 of Adequacy
of Earnings Replacement in Workers’
Compensation Programs (Hunt 2004),
developed by the National Academy of
Social Insurance, Study Panel on Benefit

Adequacy of the Academy’s Workers’
Compensation Steering Committee. This
monograph reviews the analytical options
and endorses what they call “modern
wage loss studies” as the preferred way to
address the issue of benefit adequacy.
Previous Empirical Work
Reville et al. (2001) evaluate
the benefit adequacy of workers’
compensation for permanent partial
disability (PPD) claimants in New
Mexico using this wage loss design. In
addition, they compare replacement rates
for PPD claimants in New Mexico to
PPD claimants in California, Wisconsin,
Washington, and Oregon. To calculate
loss replacement rates, they examine the
degree to which workers’ compensation
benefits, which are tax-free in all
states, offset the earnings differences
between workers with partially disabling
occupational injuries and similar workers
without injuries during the 5 years after
the injury.
During the first 5 years after the injury,
the pretax loss replacement rate in New
Mexico was 65 percent, nearly identical
to the two-thirds statutory standard. But
projections for the 10 years after the
injury show the pretax loss replacement
rate falling to 46 percent, as benefit
payments were completed, and wage
losses continued into the future. In fact,
there seems to be a permanent loss of
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earnings among workers’ compensation
claimants that remains unexplained.
Ten-year pretax replacement rates were
estimated at 37 percent in California,
42 percent in Oregon, 41 percent in
Washington, and 29 percent in Wisconsin.
Thus, New Mexico had the highest
replacement rates in any of the states.
However, after adjusting for differences
in industry composition among the states,
it was apparent that New Mexico had a
replacement rate that was in the middle.
This was the state of benefit adequacy
research when the National Academy of
Social Insurance and the Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research published
their book in 2004. The study panel
concluded that “. . . for all categories
involving substantial lost time from
work or permanent disabilities, aggregate
replacement rates are considerably below
the two-thirds standard when considered
over the 10-year period following the
injury” (p. 132).
In addition, the study panel called
for more wage loss studies from other
jurisdictions, especially studies that
included temporary disability claims and
studies from states that used alternative
methods for setting permanent partial
disability benefits. The expectation
was that additional studies would
provide more guidance to policymakers
seeking the most adequate, equitable,
and efficient wage replacement policy.
Unfortunately, no further studies were
forthcoming for the next five years.
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Tompa et al. (2010) also develop an
additional measure of benefit adequacy,
differentiating between the loss
replacement rate used in the previous
studies in the United States and what
they call the “earnings replacement
rate.” The loss replacement rate uses
the gap between postinjury earnings
of injured workers and comparison
group earnings as the denominator,
with workers’ compensation benefits
paid as the numerator to calculate the
rate. The earnings replacement rate
adds the postinjury earnings of injured
workers to the numerator, thereby
taking into account the residual earning
capacity of injured workers. The result
is a significantly higher measured
replacement rate, but also recognition of
the fact that most injured workers will
return to work and their earnings losses
will be temporary.
Figure 1 compares the postinjury
earnings plus workers’ compensation
benefits paid to injured workers with
the after-tax earnings of an uninjured
comparison group in Canada. Benefit
adequacy is expressed as the percentage
of earnings that are replaced by the
sum of workers’ compensation benefit
payments plus earnings for the 10 years

Figure 1 Aggregate Earnings Replacement Rates
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More Recent Studies
Tompa et al. (2010) have contributed
a more recent Canadian perspective to
this body of work. In a path-setting study
for the Workplace Safety and Insurance
Board in Ontario, they compare the
benefit adequacy of three Canadian
compensation regimes: 1) the permanent
impairment regime in place in Ontario
before the 1990 reforms (impairment);
2) the loss of earnings capacity regime
installed in Ontario by the 1990
reforms (loss of earnings capacity);
and 3) the “bifurcated” compensation
regime (claimant gets the higher of the
impairment or loss of earnings capacity
benefit) in British Columbia before 2002
(bifurcated).

following the injury. The figure displays
these estimates for a range of impairment
levels, from the minor (1–5 percent
impairment) to the very serious (more
than 50 percent impairment). It is worth
noting that all three of the Canadian
workers’ compensation systems achieve
at least 85 percent earnings replacement
rates, with the British Columbia
bifurcated system coming out on top
(which is predictable, given that this
scheme pays whichever of the other two
benefits is higher).
These earnings replacement rates
cannot be precisely compared with
the earlier studies in the United
States because of the differences in
methodology. However, since Tompa et
al. (2010) did report the aggregate loss
replacement rates for these three workers’
compensation regimes, this facilitates
rough comparisons with the U.S. studies
cited earlier. For the Ontario pre-1990
impairment rating system, the aggregate
after-tax loss replacement rate was 76
percent. For the post-1990 Ontario loss
of earnings capacity rating system, the
aggregate after-tax replacement rate was
80 percent. And for the British Columbia
bifurcated system, the aggregate aftertax replacement rate was 95 percent.

100
80
60
40
20
0

1–5%

6–10%

11–20%
Impairment level

SOURCE: Developed by the authors from Tompa et al. (2010).

21–50%

> 50%

Employment Research

The Workers Compensation Research
Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research recently
collaborated on a study of benefit
adequacy of the workers’ compensation
system in Michigan. Michigan does
not use an independent assessment of
the degree of impairment for injured
workers. As a proxy for severity of
injury, the number of weeks of wage
loss compensation that are paid to the
injured worker is used. It is logical that
an injury that requires more weeks away
from work is probably more serious, but
there may be other things that influence
the duration of disability payments, so
this is not the equivalent of an estimate
of residual disability that would be
available from an impairment system (as
in Ontario).
Figure 2 shows the proportional
earnings losses by duration of weekly
compensation payments compared to
the after-tax baseline earnings of the
comparison workers (set at 100 percent)
in Michigan. It is apparent from the
figure that the largest losses are sustained
by claims with disability durations over
16 weeks (about 20 percent losses) and
those receiving lump-sum settlements
of contested claims (about 60 percent
losses). The workers with less serious
injuries show earnings losses of 3–10
percent of comparison group earnings. As
in previous studies, these losses appear to
persist for many years.
Figure 3 shows the time trend of
average after-tax earnings replacement
by disability duration for each calendar
quarter around the injury. After-tax
earnings replacement rates average
96 percent, and loss replacement rates
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Figure 3 Total Compensation of Injured Workers (from Employment and Income
Benefits) Relative to Comparison Earnings
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It is also interesting to note that the
loss replacement rates and earnings
replacement rates both increase with
the severity of impairment. Clearly, all
three of these Canadian regimes were
substantially more generous in replacing
lost earnings for injured workers than
any of the U.S. jurisdictions studied
previously.
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average 76 percent for all claims.
However, the permanent nature of the
earnings reductions associated with
disability claims also stands out for

all groups as the trend lines fall below
100 percent and continue to decline
gradually for 19 quarters (nearly 5 years).
Projections out to 10 years based on the
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results in year 5 drop estimated after-tax
earnings replacement rates to 89 percent
for all claims and 67 percent for the PPD/
LS group.
One other notable feature of Figure
3 is that the lump-sum recipient group
shows actual compensation above 100
percent of comparison group earnings
in quarters 5–11 following the injury.
This reflects the administrative delays
associated with disputed workers’
compensation claims that generally have
to wait 1–3 years before their claim is
settled and payments received. Obviously
this raises questions about income
adequacy during the interim period.
While Michigan shows a good shortterm wage replacement performance
compared to other states, the workers’
compensation wage loss benefits in
Michigan do not prevent the long-term
earnings decline of injured workers
relative to those with medical-only
injuries. This remains one of the
mysteries behind these studies.
Conclusions
It is disappointing that there have not
been more of these empirical benefit
adequacy studies in the 10 years since the
National Academy of Social Insurance
panel report. In the current political
climate, perhaps it is not surprising,
but given the gravity of the concerns
expressed about the adequacy of benefits
in workers’ compensation programs,
it is unfortunate. Our methods are
improving, but the data requirements
and sensitivity of results to analytical
assumptions remain as daunting barriers.
It is still not possible to make acceptably
accurate and meaningful comparisons
among systems across different studies.
Although we have a better understanding
of some of the determinants of adequacy,
they are overwhelmed by the impact of
methodological assumptions underlying
the research results.
But there is hope from a new
approach. The Workers Compensation
Research Institute has initiated a workerinterview-based series, “Predictors of
Worker Outcomes,” in eight states,
and plans to increase the number of
states and repeat the survey in some
states to provide benchmarks of
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system performance as more evidence
accumulates. Despite the fact that the
measure of wage loss is a subjective one,
this effort has two major advantages over
the data-intensive wage-replacement
studies conducted to date. First, it pairs
the question of postinjury earnings
recovery with parallel concerns about
the access to and satisfaction with
medical care, the perceived recovery
of health and function, and the return
to work performance for a random
sample of individual injured workers.
Second, a more holistic and less dataintensive approach promises more useful
comparisons between states and a more
thorough understanding of the adequacy
of workers’ compensation benefits.
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The establishment of this award
further pursues the mission of the
Upjohn Institute: to support and
conduct policy-oriented research on
issues related to employment and
unemployment. Dissertations were
judged by a panel of economists on
the basis of policy relevance, technical
quality of research, and presentation.
PRIZES
The co-winners of the W.E. Upjohn
Institute Dissertation Award each
receive a prize of $2,500. The
honorable mention recipient receives
a $1,000 prize.
2015 DEADLINE
The deadline for submission for
the 2015 W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research Dissertation
Award is July 6, 2015. Any individual
whose dissertation has been accepted
during the 24-month period of July 1,
2013, to June 30, 2015, is eligible for
the 2015 prize. Contact the Institute
for more information: http://www
.upjohn.org.
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Zhuan Pei

How Long before
Recertifying Medicaid
and CHIP Children?
I

ncome-based eligibility recertification
is an essential component in virtually
all means-tested social programs in the
United States. It exists to ensure that
the benefit is targeted at the neediest
individuals or families. In many studies
that examine the effect of means-tested
programs on labor supply, an implicit
assumption is that program eligibility
is constantly monitored. However,
many of these programs do not operate
this way, and the time between two
consecutive eligibility certifications, or
the “recertification period,” can be as
long as a year. Although this policy lever
is recognized and its effect on program
participation is explored in several studies
of transfer programs (e.g., Currie and
Grogger 2001; Kabbani and Wilde 2003;
Prell 2008; and Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu
2008), a formal theoretical and empirical
investigation has not been carried out to
address how program participants may
respond to the incentives resulting from
the lack of constant income monitoring.
In my research, I attempt to fill this
gap by examining families’ behavioral
responses to the continuous eligibility
provision for children participating in
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP, or simply
CHIP). The analysis of income and labor
supply responses is key in answering
the important policy question of how
often eligibility monitoring should be
conducted.
Uninterrupted eligibility monitoring
ensures that an income-tested program is
effectively targeting the needy. However,
if monitoring is costly and incomes
of program participants change little
over time, it may be sensible for the
government to decrease the frequency
of eligibility checks and offer a period
of “continuous eligibility.” Granting

continuous eligibility increases the value
of a transfer program to its participants in
two ways. First, less frequent monitoring
reduces transaction costs associated with
gathering eligibility materials and visiting
caseworkers for program beneficiaries.
Second, continuous eligibility provisions
allow families to be less constrained in
their labor supply decisions. That is, once
households qualify for an income-tested
program for a specified period, they will
not be disqualified even if their incomes
exceed the maximum income threshold,
allowing them to work the desired
amount while retaining their benefits.
However, the provisions increase the
possibility for less needy households
to lower their incomes temporarily in

Continuous eligibility
provisions allow families to
be less constrained in their
labor supply decisions.
order to qualify for the program, and
then revert to their usual incomes while
enjoying the benefits.
Because the families that behave
strategically are not the intended
beneficiaries of the program, setting the
continuous eligibility period involves
the trade-off between minimizing the
number of such families and reducing
the economic loss associated with
monitoring. As mentioned above, the loss
includes the administrative costs to the
government, pecuniary and time costs
of families participating in the program,
and the deprivation of program benefits
for some of the families most in need
when the transaction costs of eligibility
recertifications become insurmountable.
Olson, Tang, and Newacheck (2005)
show that children who experience
interruptions in health insurance coverage

are more likely to have unmet health care
needs; therefore, imposing bureaucratic
burden on otherwise eligible families
may reduce targeting efficiency as well.
Given these trade-offs, understanding
the behavioral response to the lack of
eligibility monitoring has important
policy implications. The recertification
period may be too long if we find
evidence of families strategically and
temporarily lowering their incomes in
order to gain program eligibility. If no
strategic behavior is found, however, it
may be beneficial to lengthen the period
of eligibility.
Income and Labor Supply Responses
I carry out an empirical investigation
of the labor supply effect of the
continuous eligibility provisions in the
context of Medicaid/CHIP and provide
a framework to compute the optimal
eligibility recertification frequency.
Along with creating the SCHIP program,
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 gives
states the option to continuously insure
children for up to 12 months in their
public insurance programs regardless of
changes in family income during that
period. A third of the states implemented
the continuous eligibility option in their
public insurance program for children.
These states present an opportunity
to gauge the significance of the
aforementioned strategic behavior, which
then sheds light on the choice of the
optimal continuous eligibility period.
Using the 2001 and 2004 panels
of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation, I follow an event-study
framework and trace out families’
incomes as their children enrolled in
Medicaid/CHIP. Figure 1 plots the
movement of average family incomes
over the 48 months around the beginning
of a public insurance spell.
Neither of the panels shows a
pronounced dip-and-rebound in income
in the six months before and after the
spell start. For the 2001 panel, the income
trend leading up to the beginning of the
public insurance spell is practically flat;
the average income increases gradually
during the spell especially after 12
months, but the period immediately
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Figure 1 Average Family Income by Month in Public Insurance Spell
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Panel B: 2004 SIPP
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following the spell start shows no
rebound. In the 2004 panel, the income
process shows a persistent downward
trend throughout the four-year window
without a visible rebound.
Even though the strategic behavior
predicted by the labor supply model is
not salient in Figure 1, certain subgroups
may be expected to exhibit stronger
responses than others. Examining these
subgroups separately may help to isolate
the effects that are otherwise masked in
the full sample. Among others, I select
several subsamples in which families
may adjust their labor supply more easily
(two-parent families), be more likely to
understand program rules (at least one
parent is college educated), or face a
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Comparisons of income processes
between counterfactual groups are
also carried out to address the issues
of unaccounted income trends over a
Medicaid/CHIP spell, concentration of
strategic behavior in only a subset of
the families, as well as possible model
misspecification in the calibration
exercise. I compare the income processes
between high- and low-income families
and families in states that did and did
not provide 12 months of continuous
eligibility to simultaneously address
all three of those issues. High-income
families and those living in states
providing 12-month continuous eligibility
are expected to exhibit stronger strategic
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the rebound magnitude to be statistically
significant between the different groups.
Again, the result provides no evidence
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predicted by a standard economic model.
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stronger incentive to behave strategically
(families with more children). The
subsample analyses reveal income trends
similar to those in the full sample and are
not indicative of strategic behavior.
Testing Model Predictions
Because of the relatively small
sample size, I cannot strictly rule out
a small income rebound in several of
my samples. Therefore, I calibrate the
expected income rebound magnitude
based on a standard economic model
and compare it to the actual rebound
magnitude. In all subsamples, the actual
rebound magnitude is smaller than
the model-predicted magnitude, and

With strategic behavior practically
ruled out, I explore the following policy
question: What is the right recertification
frequency for families participating in
Medicaid/CHIP? The two key factors
in answering the question are 1) the
volatility of the income process, and
2) the costs associated with recertification.
Intuitively, if income does not change
at all over time, then the government
only needs to check income once to
identify the needy population. But if
there is a lot of movement across the
public insurance eligibility cutoff, more
frequent recertifications may be called
for, which will remove families from the
program when they no longer need the
benefits. The need to monitor income
must then be weighed against the cost of
eligibility recertification, which should
be conducted less frequently if the
cost of the verification process is high
for the government or for the program
participants.
Using a simple economic
framework, I compute the optimal

monitoring frequency under various
assumptions regarding social welfare
and recertification costs. The calculation
suggests that 12 months may serve as a
lower bound on the length of the optimal
continuous eligibility period. That
said, with technological advancement
and improved data sharing among
government agencies, recertification costs
may decrease significantly in the future,
in which case the continuous eligibility
period can be shortened to improve
targeting efficiency.

The WEfocus Book Series
The Upjohn Press has begun a new series of “short books” called the “WEfocus
series.” Books in this series will be authored by noted experts in the subjects and
will provide a concise discussion of a range of important labor market issues along
with the programs and policy recommendations that address those issues. The most
recent book in the series is From Preschool to Prosperity: The Economic Payoff to
Early Childhood Education, by Timothy J. Bartik. Other entries currently scheduled
to appear in the series will address workers’ compensation, the railroad retirement
system, apprenticeships, employer resource networks, and natural disasters and the
labor market. Books in this series will be available as paperbacks and as free PDF
downloads from http://www.upjohn.org.
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